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Richard Eldridge
WORDSWORTH AND
"A NEW CONDITION OF PHILOSOPHY"
IT will seem odd to both philosophers and literary critics to claim a
central relation—both for the practice of philosophy and for under-
standing Wordsworth—between Wordsworth and philosophy. It will
seem odd to philosophers on the one hand because it is trivial, in that
holding some very general assumptions about humanity is inevitable for
anyone, so why not for Wordsworth, and, on the other hand, because
Wordsworth is so obviously literary: his having held such assumptions is
obviously not what matters about him; he tells stories and purveys
images, philosophers may note, rather than producing reasoned argu-
ments for his claims. It will seem odd to many or most literary critics
nowadays because, in the wakes of existentialism, New Criticism with its
attentions to paradoxes of expression, poststructuralism, and New
Historicism, it appears that there is no such thing as the practice of
philosophy into which anyone could enter: there's only willful self-
assertion, or ideology, or pervasive irony, or paradox, or thought
undoing itself, or shifts in cultural épistèmes; reason is impotent either to
validate or to condemn deep views about human nature, justice, or the
good, views which instead come to individuals only as a result of their
contingent individual psychologies or cultural circumstances. But a
central relation between Wordsworth and philosophy is nonetheless
what I wish to claim.
This claim is not a matter simply of tracing influences from philoso-
phy in Wordsworth's writing as such. There are many ways to be
influenced by canonical philosophical writings that are not themselves
distinctively philosophical, such as borrowing images and general
conceptions of human life (as in Yeats 's references to Plato). Such
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borrowings do not constitute entering into the enterprise of philoso-
phy, do not embody the dialectical movement of thought in conversa-
tion with its traditions, seeking deep necessities of reason. Wordsworth's
writings, however, do importantly embody this dialectical movement, I
claim, in ways that transfigure and deepen our sense of the possibilities
of practice of both philosophy and poetry. Surveying his achievement is
hence something more than a chapter in the history of literary ideas. It
makes available to us awareness of forces, modes of expression, and
results that already implicitly figure in and are expressed by all writing
about human value. It shows us what our reflective engagements with
questions of human value have been implicitly and can be self-
consciously. In doing this, Wordsworth's writing transfigures our under-
standing of reason and its relations to images, plots, and sociohistorical
circumstances.
Wordsworth did not centrally or typically produce philosophical
theories. He is not read by philosophers as a philosopher, as one whose
abstract, systematic views of human life or nature or God matter apart
from their contexts of production. He writes centrally about his own
life, about his reactions to certain scenes and incidents, and about the
reactions and experiences of imagined particular others. When he tries
to be explicitly theoretical and systematic, he is often at his didactic and
obscurantist worst.1 The provisional views about human life at which he
arrives cannot be understood or assessed without attending to his
particular experiences and his actions. The subject and the object of his
reflections—humanity and its triumphs and reversals as they have
appeared in him—are identical. In all these senses, Wordsworth is, in
his central preoccupations, what we would be inclined to call literary. It
follows that the claim that there is a central relation betweenWordsworth
and philosophy implies and argues for the further claims that there is a
central interrelation between philosophy and literature, at least when
certain values in human life are in question, and that philosophy, when
these values are in question, cannot profitably bypass the consideration
of culture and cultural figures in order to achieve its results more
directly.
So how does Wordsworth, in his literariness, do this thing, enter
innovatively into the practice of philosophy? What might following out
Wordsworth's practice tell us about the possibilities and prospects of
philosophy and literature in a postfoundationalist, postsystèmatic age?
What might it teach us about Wordsworth's own peculiar ambitions,
egotism, and spiritual formation? What might it teach us about the
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simultaneous inevitability and impossibility of philosophy itself as a
condition of human life? What is it to take seriously both the demands
of reason and the pervasiveness of contingency?
I
Philosophy has had as its traditional defining ambition the effort to
transcend locality and conventionality. It has sought inter alia timeless
and necessary truths about essences rather than temporally circum-
scribed and contingent descriptions of local organizations of phenom-
ena, framework principles of all possible experience rather than
particular empirical observations, the analytic rather than the synthetic,
accounts of how one simply as a person ought to live rather than
prescriptions only for Athenians or Americans or Christians or proletar-
ians. Seemingly, only if it is possible to fulfill this ambition will
philosophy be able to secure its autonomy either from opinion or from
the various empirical sciences and will it further be able to establish the
governing conditions for fully human and rationally mandated judg-
ment and self-responsibility.
It is hard not to believe that we have some capacity for transcending
local circumstances and conventions. Too many people apparently
succeed in putting behind them reasonably such things as the preoccu-
pations of childhood and the mores of their neighborhoods or classes
for it to be clear that we cannot resist the influences of particular
circumstances on us. Within recent postfoundationalist, hermeneutic
conceptions of philosophy, however, it seems equally hard to believe
that philosophy's traditional defining ambition can be realized. Rich-
ard Rorty has urged that it is time to accept the fact "that the notions of
criteria and choice . . . are no longer in point when it comes to changes
from one language game to another":2 there's just social change.
Consequently, following Freud, we should "abjure the notion of the
'truly human'" and give up the traditional ambitions of philosophy, for
there are in the world only webs of relations, not persons with an
essential humanity waiting to be realized.3
What motivates this thought of Rorty's is the now common idea that
intuitions are shaped by theoretical and practical backgrounds. What
one accepts as relevant data for thinking about essences or principles of
possible experience or impersonal necessities seems to us, in looking at
the past of philosophy, to depend significantly on tacit conceptual
frameworks and practical and spiritual aspirations specific to local
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communities. Plato seems to speak for the aspirations of mathemati-
cally inclined Greek elites, Descartes for those who are committed to
modern science yet retain Augustinian senses of individual inwardness
and autonomy, Hume for those who share the managerial ambitions of
the modern social sciences to ameliorate social misery, and so on. Even
if we were to succeed, moreover, in discovering necessary truths about
structures of reality, about procedures for scientific investigation, or
about modes of human conduct, we would, as Hegel insistently noted,
nonetheless still face the further problem of how to bring these
discoveries fruitfully to bear on our present practices. What counts as
appropriately harmonizing the elements of one's soul, as judging on
the basis of clear and distinct perception, as doing what is natural, in
this time and place? Here, too, the particular and local seemingly must
influence what we will specifically make of ourselves, even if philosophy
is granted certain abstract, intellectual successes. Rorty's casualness
about the impotence of reason is thus a plausible response to the
difficulties of reason in envisioning and instancing a culture ofjustice.
The persistence of multifarious, even apparently incommensurable,
forms of domination, despite, and perhaps because of, reason as we
have known it is a pervasive social fact. How, then, can we reasonably
persist in our philosophical ambitions? But how, equally, without
unnaturally repressing our own reflectiveness and capabilities of partial
transcendence, can we give these ambitions up?
Romanticism, it can be argued, is a form of human sensibility,
dominant in the early part of the nineteenth century in both England
and Germany, and above all in Wordsworth, that takes these questions
seriously, that sees a human life as shaped by its ongoing struggle with
them. Wordsworthian Romanticism is marked by a continuous aware-
ness of the local and temporal situatedness of human thought, so much
so that human thought is typically represented as occasioned by specific
places and as including an awareness of its own temporal development.
Wordsworth's "metaphysical paeans," as Kenneth R.Johnston has put it,
"are motivated from specific social and personal situations."4 Yet at the
same time it continues in the traditional ambition of philosophy to help
us found our lives on deep necessities of our nature, against the stale
conventionalities that it confronts: it has its metaphysical paeans.
Within this form of human sensibility, philosophical reflectiveness
about deep necessities that ought to govern human life is understood as
neither impotent in the face of the onrush of specific practices nor as
their complete and perfect master. Philosophical reflectiveness be-
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comes situated as an expression of particular responsiveness to the
general human problem of leading a life authentically, in awareness of
deep necessities, rather than only conventionally and mechanically.
Romantic philosophical reflectiveness thus resists full closure and
generality as it retains its sense of the particular. But at the same time it
resists deflation into a narrative of the merely particular as it continues
to strive to achieve generality.
Romanticism's particular way of expressing its responsiveness to both
its situatedness and its continuing philosophical ambition further
involves a kind of studied ambiguity or alternation between literary
particularities and philosophical generalities. Passages ofhighly charged,
particularized, and competing landscape description alternate with
passages of metaphysics. If such amalgamations are what philosophical
thinking and the search for self-understanding naturally and fully come
to, in Wordsworth's writing, then our struggles for self-understanding
now can be and are fed not so much by reason and its confident
assurances and assertions as by the competing but also complicit claims
of individual power and communal engagement. Philosophy itself is
thus cast as literary, insofar as Romanticism sees no routes to under-
standings of human mindedness and its possibilities of authenticity
apart from narrations of highly contextualized expressions of our
mindedness and its influences and attractions. Yet literature itself is cast
as philosophical, insofar as Romanticism sees all narrations of particu-
lar experience as at the same time expressions of common human
mindedness and its possibilities of development.
In all these ways—in its simultaneous awareness of the situatedness
and the unavoidability of its general reflections, in its simultaneous
sense of the conditions and limits of general theorizing and refusal to
scant our capacities for transcendence, in its resistance to closure while
still seeking generality, and in its ambiguous alternations between
traditional philosophical generalizing and traditional literary narration
of the particular—Romanticism, standing at the intersection ofEnlight-
enment and Christian self-confidence with historicist and anthropologi-
cal doubt, thus offers us a "placement of the [situated] human person
at the center" of reflectiveness that is a "new condition of philosophy,
not metaphysical elaboration."5 It teaches us to ask new ranges of
questions about any text of self-understanding: not only, "is its argu-
ment sound?" or "are its images compelling?" but also, "how does it
express (and repress) the competing claims of individuality and com-
munity?" and "how does it stand as present prophecy about the
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contextual conciliation of these claims?"6 Romanticism both offers us
and itself scrutinizes highly temporalized, contextualized, and révis-
able, yet still general, interpretations of human being in the world and
its possibilities of fullest development. It thus offers us, potentially, a
way between existentialist and ultimately postmodernist images of our
unconstrained freedom and lack of responsibility to merely so-called
necessities, on the one hand, and the inflexible closures of perfected
theories of value that distinguish the classical philosophical tradition,
on the other. To follow outWordsworthian Romanticism's enactment of
this new condition of philosophy will thus be one way to test our own
possibilities for philosophy as an ongoing interpretive enterprise in a
time of omnipresent historicist and anthropological doubt.
II
Since Geoffrey Hartman 's epochal Wordsworth's Poetry, 1787—1814 in
1964, it has been widely recognized that Wordsworth's poetic achieve-
ment is fundamentally structured by the recountings of his alternating
experiences, as a traveler halted in a particular spot, of the sublime and
the beautiful, by what Hartman calls his moments of apocalypse and
akedah.7 The 1974 publication of the essay fragment on "The Sublime
and the Beautiful" (initially conjectured 1811-12, but more likely "a
palimpsest of materials written between 1806 and 1819" and revised
between 1820 and 1823)8 in the Prose Works enables us to review
Wordsworth's own account of the characters of these fundamental
moments of experience that structure his poetry and inform the
understandings of human life that it embodies. In this fragment,
Wordsworth compactly summarizes his views about the agencies of
education that can lead human beings in particular natural contexts
toward understandings and achievements of authentically human life.
Strikingly, Wordsworth throughout the fragment condemns all ef-
forts to achieve an understanding of our best possibilities of human life
that require us to step outside human experience so as to see the world
as it is, as it were, in itself.
The true province of the philosopher is not to grope about in the
external world &, when he has perceived or detected in an object such or
such a quality or power, to set himself to the task of persuading the world
that such is a sublime or beautiful object, but to look into his own mind
& determine the law by which he is affected. ... To talk of an object as
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being sublime or beautiful in itself, without references to some subject by
whom that sublimity or beauty is perceived, is absurd. . . .9
Wordsworth's account of the importance for human life of these
experiences of sublimity and beauty is thus fully internalist or im-
manentist. Whatever sense we can make of how and why these experi-
ences matter, we must make from within the having of them. "Neither
the immediate nor the final cause of [how experiences of sublimity and
beauty recur and influence us over time] need here be examined" (p.
349)—perhaps because focusing on immediate causes would derogate
our autonomous contributions to these experiences, while focusing on
final causes would make any account of their importance too
decontextualized to be plausible. We must attempt to understand these
experiences and their value by taking them as they specifically come to
us.
Despite its marked internalism, however, Wordsworth's account of
the sublime and the beautiful includes a sense of the transcendental
importance of the experiences of them. No matter what local back-
ground, temperament, taste, relations, and so on one might have, the
regular experience ofboth the sublime and the beautiful is, Wordsworth
judges, necessary for a fully human life. This is a claim about the
capacities of persons as such, a claim about what their nature makes
possible and impossible for them. "It is impossible that a mind can be in
a healthy state that is not frequently and strongly moved by both beauty
and sublimity . . ." (p. 249). That is, it is a necessary truth about persons
that they must, if they are to live authentically, experience both
sublimity and beauty. This necessary truth further supports a clear
normative demand that transcends local interests and situations. Given
that persons in general ought to live authentically and humanly, they
ought further to open themselves to these experiences. Human
mindedness as such ought to be shaped by them. "It is of infinite
importance to the noblest feelings of the Mind & to its very highest
powers that the forms of Nature should be accurately contemplated, 8c,
if described, in language that shall prove that we understand the several
grand constitutional laws under which it has been ordained that these
objects should everlastingly affect the mind . . ." (p. 350; italics mine).
Beginning, it would seem, by working through his own experiences
of the sublime and the beautiful, Wordsworth has here arrived, or
claims to have arrived, at an understanding of what is required of
human beings as such, if they are to live according to the best
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possibilities of their nature. A kind of transcendentalism—a sense of
what is required of human-mindedness in general, not only of what it is
best for particularly situated persons to do—survives and even grows
out of particular experience. This transcendentalism is expressed in a
kind of prophetic reminder—not quite an abstract, decontextualized,
categorical moral principle, but not quite a hypothetical imperative
addressed to wants, either—of the importance for human life of the
experiences of beauty and sublimity. Philosophical reflection about the
general demands our nature places on itself is here sited as internal to
particular human experience.
In order to appreciate Wordsworth's transcendental claims fully and
in order to assess their plausibility, it is necessary to elaborate in detail
what further human experiences and traits of character, in Wordsworth's
view, are enabled or awakened or quickened or developed by the
experiences of the sublime and the beautiful. In Wordsworth's judg-
ment, each of these experiences directly bears all at once on political
life, human relationships, self-understanding, one's possibilities of
writing, and the general life of culture, and it is through the fact of
these effects that the sublime and the beautiful display their transcen-
dental importance. Roughly, the personal and political effects, the
values, and the typical figures of the sublime and the beautiful can be
set out in a table of opposites.10
Effects, Values, and Figures
OfSublimity
ecstasy
transcendence
revolutionism
contest
autonomy
timelessness
sounding cataracts
ruggedness
depth
disruption, abandonment
apocalypse
madness
indeterminacy
tolerance
distance
otherness
inspiration, writing as automatism
freedom, the moral law, reason, awe, fear
"[the] sense of repose [that is
necessary for sublimity] is the result
of reason & the moral law" (p. 355)
OfBeauty
limitation
communicability
Burkean conservatism
conciliation
connectedness, culture
locality
pastoral landscape
smoothness
surface
dwelling, domestication
akedah
hollowness, conventionality
order, harmony
attentiveness
nurture
solidarity
composure, craft, discipline
love, engagement, gentleness
"... the love & gentleness
which accompany
[beauty]" (p. 349)
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In his prose writing and his poetry, Wordsworth, as Theresa M. Kelley
has noted, "repeatedly describes sublimity and beauty as successive,
then competing categories,"11 just as the poetry similarly repeatedly
represents scenes of abandonment to the sublime that are then
recuperated and made intelligible through a subsequent experience of
the beautiful. Thus the sublime is "harnessed ... to a reiterated
aesthetic contest with the beautiful [and] this contest ... is the scene of
Wordsworth's aesthetic instruction."12 Given, further, the ranges of
effects, values, and figures involved in the experiences of the sublime
and the beautiful, this continuing contest is equally the scene of
Wordsworth's political, moral, perceptual, religious, and writerly in-
struction—indeed, of his instruction as a philosophical and human
intelligence capable of persisting in transcendental claims from within
individual experiences.
Crucially, that the sublime and the beautiful, together with their
effects, figures, and values, continuously contest or compete with one
another within Wordsworth's consciousness and writing is not, in his
view, an accidental or contingent feature of them, not simply an
arbitrarily willed artistic conception that might be rejected. Beauty and
its values and effects are in the first instance necessary for sublimity.
Without a certain amount of domestication of the object of experience
for the conscious mind, the mind will simply be overwhelmed or
terrified and will fail to enter into the elevations of one's autonomy and
reason that are central to the experience of sublimity. "If personal fear
be strained beyond a certain point, this sensation [of sublimity] is soon
destroyed . . ." (p. 354). That is, if the awe and fear that are distinctive
of the sublime are too overwhelming, then the experience of "intense
unity" (p. 354) that is essential to sublimity will be dissipated. Instead, in
all genuinely sublime experience, "awe or personal apprehension"
typical of the sublime and "the milder influence of duration" associated
with the beautiful "act conjointly" (p. 353). The sublime thus requires
an admixture of the beautiful in order to achieve its proper effects.
Likewise, the experience of the beautiful requires an admixture of
sublimity or a contribution from the mind's own resources, if the
experience of beauty is to be anything more than a passively experi-
enced charm of sensation.
Yet despite being necessary for the experience of sublimity, the
experience of beauty is at the same time entirely incompatible with it.
"The same object may be both sublime & beautiful; or, speaking more
accurately, ... it may have the power of affecting us both with the sense
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of beauty & the sense of sublimity; tho' . . . the mind cannot be affected
by both these sensations at the same time, for they are not only
different from, but opposite to, each other" (p. 349). It would seem
then that we can experience neither sublimity nor beauty. Each
experience seemingly requires that other to occur simultaneously as a
condition of its possibility, yet each experience cancels the other out.
The result is that we cannot fully immerse ourselves in either
experience and its values. The admixture of beauty that figures in the
experience of sublimity undoes the liberating effects of the sublime,
while the admixture of sublimity in beauty undoes the rebinding effects
of the beautiful. Each admixture thus undermines and challenges the
effects and values of the other. To achieve a balance between the effects
of these experiences would be to enter a state of dulled ordinariness, a
state that immediately calls for the unbinding effects of sublimity and
subsequently for the chastening effects of the beautiful, leading into
alternations without end. To have human consciousness at all, in
Wordsworth's conception, is to be caught continually between these two
poles of experience. Aspects of sublimity and of beauty, in changing
relations of relative dominance, figure in each experience we have. We
find ourselves continually either swerving between imperfect or always
already internally compromised experiences of beauty and sublimity.
Thus Wordsworth describes the "savage torpor" of his countrymen,
deadened by the requirements of civility and order, as a state that is
disrupted for them only by "outrageous stimulation" of the sort that he
describes himself as having succumbed to at the Bartholomew Fair.13
To the extent then that the claims about the transcendental impor-
tance for human life of the experiences of both sublimity and beauty
can be sustained, they must be sustained from within these swerves
between internally compromised experiences. We can only acknowl-
edge the importance of these distinctive dimensions of human experi-
ence through our encounters with what we take to be exemplary, albeit
compromised, possibilities of experience, in ourselves and others. We
cannot know the pure essences of these experiences apart from their
imperfect alternating manifestations. We must interpret for ourselves
the significance of these experiences that simultaneously enable and
cancel one another, as they occur in both our own lives and the other
lives we encounter narratively. While experiences of sublimity and
beauty may be had from encounters with other people—for example in
the power of virtuoso musical performance or in the charms of
amiability—and thus may have a social history, the capacity for these
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experiences is nonetheless natural to the person, as they figure dimly in
each experience we have. Ifwe are to live fully and humanly, Wordsworth
judges, then we must fully receive and enact their simultaneously
opposed and complementary instructions.
Do the experiences of sublimity and beauty then have, for everyone,
the importance that Wordsworth claims for them? Are their regular
occurrences genuinely necessary conditions for a fully human life, for
the healthy life of a humanly minded creature? Most importantly, to
what extent can a poet's understanding of the importance of these
experiences and their values both be achieved through his writing,
which opens itself to them, and lend authority to it? These questions,
particularly the last, are the questions fundamentally in play in The
Prelude, as Wordsworth attempts to review his own fostering "alike by
beauty and by fear" (I, 302) ,14 so as to establish the fitness of his
philosophical understanding, hence his further fitness to write the
great poem of social instruction that he took to lie before him as his
major appointed task. At issue for Wordsworth is whether he will be
able to "speak / A lasting inspiration" (XIV, 446-47), to articulate and
sustain transcendental claims about human life despite his acceptance
of the internality of philosophical reflection to particular situations.
Whether there are any possibilities for achieving and sustaining
transcendental claims from within one's own experience—whether
there are any possibilities for interpretive philosophy that would claim
philosophy's traditional defining ambitions while acknowledging its
own particular situatedness—is hence something that we can hope to
test by scrutinizing Wordsworth's effort to achieve and sustain the
transcendental claims on which he would rest his own authority. How
does The Prelude end? Is its claim to enact an achievement of transcen-
dental understanding plausible? Do we, from our own experiences, find
its transcendental conclusions to stand, to "speak / A lasting inspira-
tion"? How might a lasting inspiration be spoken?
Ill
Book XIV of the 1850 Prelude, entitled "Conclusion," unpublished
during Wordsworth's lifetime, and itself the result of continuous
reworking of Book XIII, "Conclusion," of the likewise unpublished
1805 Prelude, with major revisions carried out in 1806, 1816-19, 1831-
32, and 1838-39, is the result ofWordsworth's continuous attempts to
achieve for the story of his own formation a moral or ending that would
carry general significance. It is in Book XIV that Wordsworth reflects
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directly on the significance of the experiences described in the preced-
ing books, in the hope of arriving at sustainable general claims about
human life. Book XIV thus represents, particularly in its opening third,
where the ascent of Snowdon is narrated and its metaphysical and
social importance developed, what Johnston has called "the poem's
fullest elaboration of its 'spots of time' representation of mental
growth: expectation, followed by surprise, leading to reinterpretation
of mental powers, and here more than anywhere else, to metaphysical
generalization and social application."15 In recounting the ascent of
Snowdon, during which various aspects of beauty and sublimity are
experienced alternately and in fusion, and in meditating on its signifi-
cance, Book XIV thus develops and completes the concluding claim of
Book XIII that the poet had, with sublime visionariness, "seemed about
this time to gain clear sight / Of a new world" (XIII, 369-70), yet in
such a way that this world remained "fit / To be transmitted, and to
other eyes / Made visible" (XIII, 370-72), in keeping with the value of
communicability associated with the experience of beauty. The account
of the ascent of Snowdon that opens Book XIV records experiences of
aspects of both sublimity and beauty, until the poet then turns explicitly
to both metaphysical and social interpretation of these experiences
(together with the prior experiences they in turn recall) as he seeks his
conclusion.
Within Book XIV, the crucial passages where the conclusions are
tested occur in lines 130-70. These lines follow the opening narration
of the ascent, which occupies lines 1-62 and the initial metaphysical
interpretation of that ascent's significance, given in lines 63-129, in
which we are told that minds that "Acknowledge when thus moved"
(XTV, 87) that sublimity and beauty bear their transcendental impor-
tance for human life are "truly from the Deity, . . . Powers [who possess]
the highest bliss / That flesh can know" (XIV, 113-15). 16 Following
these grand passages of the metaphysics of Imagination and ofminds as
Powers, lines 130-70 then attempt to resituate these claims within the
frame of the life of the poet, in order to represent them as recording
real and significant possibilities of human life that we may, like the
poet, enter into through a course of formation, rather than simply
groundless and philosophicallyjejune metaphysical speculations. Lines
130-70 record Wordsworth's crucial attempt to establish his metaphysi-
cal elaborations as livable claims for himself and for us. It is thus in
these lines that the possibility of sustaining transcendental claims from
within the frame of a particular, situated human life is most fully tested.
What enabled the poet's understanding of the transcendental impor-
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tance for human life of sublimity and beauty, together with their
associated values? How might the values supported by imperfect
experiences of sublimity and beauty be fruitfully combined within a
particular human life? Has the poet's life itself really so combined these
values? What agencies of formation made this possible, if it is actual? In
taking up these questions explicitly in lines 130-70, Wordsworth is, as
Johnston aptly observes, attempting "to generalize this power [that is
emblematized in the ascent of Snowdon] to others"; we see in this effort
at generalization "evidence from a relatively narrow range of morality,
used to support extremely large claims: Wordsworth attesting that his
own mind's restoration is a philosophic possibility for the general Mind
of Man."17
How compelling are these crucial passages that generalize possibili-
ties of formation? Here is how Wordsworth describes, for the last time,
his own particular formation, attempting to bring out its exemplary and
generalizable character.
Oh! who is he that hath his whole life long
Preserved, enlarged, this freedom in himself?
For this alone is genuine liberty:
Where is the favoured being who hath held
That course unchecked, unerring, and untired,
In one perpetual progress smooth and bright?—
A humbler destiny have we retraced,
And told of lapse and hesitating choice,
And backwards wanderings along thorny ways:
Yet—compassed round by mountain solitudes,
Within whose solemn temple I received
My earliest visitations, careless then
Of what was given me: and which now I range,
A meditative, oft a suffering man—
Do I declare—in accents which, from truth
Deriving cheerful confidence, shall blend
Their modulation with these vocal streams—
That, whatsoever falls my better mind,
Revolving with the accidents of life,
May have sustained, that, howso'er misled,
Never did I, in quest of right and wrong,
Tamper with conscience from a private aim;
Nor was in any public hope the dupe
Of selfish passions; nor did ever yield
Wilfully to mean cares or low pursuits,
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But shrunk with apprehensive jealousy
From every combination which might aid
The tendency, too potent in itself,
Of use and custom to bow down the soul
Under a growing weight of vulgar sense,
And substitute a universe of death
For that which moves with light and life informed,
Actual, divine, and true. To fear and love,
To love as prime and chief, for there fear ends,
Be this ascribed; to early intercourse,
In presence of sublime or beautiful forms,
With the adverse principles of pain and joy—
Evil as one is rashly named by men
Who know not what they speak. By love subsists
All lasting grandeur, by pervading love;
That gone we are as dust.
(XIV, 130-70)
A number of significant features here mark Wordsworth's effort at
conclusion, at generalizing, humanizing, and representing as exem-
plary the course of his own development. There is, first of all, its
markedly internalist perspective on how understanding and satisfaction
of transcendental demands might be achieved within an ordinary
human life, a life that is not a "perpetual progress smooth and bright,"
but rather includes "lapse and hesitating choice, / And backwards
wanderings along thorny ways" (XIV, 135, 137-38). The claim is that
the progress that has been enacted and recounted is not the progress of
a categorically superior being, able to understand the shapes and values
of human life from without. Significantly, these passages that emphasize
the internalist perspective (XIV, 133-46) are 1832 additions, as though
Wordsworth throughout his revisions increasingly found it important to
qualify and contextualize the grander transcendental claims that al-
ready appear in the 1805 text, if those claims were to carry conviction as
marking out humanly achievable values.
Second, there are the repeated presences within these lines of
alternating, mutually qualifying figures of both sublimity and beauty, of
both autonomy and connectedness. "Genuine liberty" (XIV, 132) and
its sublimity are represented as lived by a suffering, engaged human
figure who retains in his sufferings the likenesses to others that are
reinforced by the experience of beauty. The sublime "vocal streams" of
the text are to "blend their modulation" with "accents . . . / Deriving
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cheerful confidence . . . from truth," in keeping with the values of
composure, communication, and surface that are associated with the
beautiful (XIV, 144-46). The sublime capacity of the soul to resist "The
tendency, too potent in itself, / Of use and custom to bow down the
soul / Under a growing weight ofvulgar sense" is itself upheld not from
within the soul alone, but by "early intercourse" or connectedness with
forms in nature (XIV, 157-59, 164).
Most importantly, however, not only are figures of sublimity and
beauty incorporated into the text, but the text's overt doctrine further
traces the poet's ability to blend the values of the sublime and the
beautiful directly to the influence of sublimity and beauty themselves.
"To fear and love . . . / Be this"—the poet's human survival and human
understanding and satisfaction of transcendental demands—"ascribed;
to early intercourse, / In presence of sublime or beautiful forms, /
With the adverse principles of pain and joy" (XIV, 162-66). The
quickening of the soul and the transcendence of stale custom that stem
from the experience of the sublime have themselves, it is claimed, been
cured by "love as prime and chief (XIV, 163), by the harmony among
people and nature that the experience of beauty makes manifest.
" This"—the fact that the poet, a suffering human being, survived and
flourished, despite lapses, reversals, and accidents of circumstances and
mood—is the result of experiences of "sublime or beautiful forms."
And so anyone who fully receives these experiences (which require a
cast of mind as well as a stimulus) may likewise survive and flourish,
likewise come to understand and satisfy the transcendental demands on
human nature that can make themselves fitfully evident through them.
IV
Do we trust and honor this transcendental claim? Can we see our
own possibilities in Wordsworth's account of his formation? Or does
Wordsworth's account rather enact only fantasized, pleading, and
implausible claims to both poetic and moral authority—fantasized
because Wordsworth's formation was not or could not have been what
he claimed it to be, pleading in its desperate wish to hold its audience
by making any transcendental claim no matter how baseless, and
implausible because of its fantasized and pleading character? Ever since
his continuing efforts to articulate and sustain transcendental claims
from within his own experience first became widely evident in "Tintern
Abbey," in the Intimations Ode, and in the other largest published
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poems of his early career, Wordsworth has regularly been charged with
implausibility and egotism. This charge seems to apply to The Prelude
with special force. As Johnston has noted, "Cultural egotism, substitut-
ing the individual imagination for vanishing social tradition [as a
source of poetic and moral authority], is the central point of The
Prelude. . . "w
This charge of egotism tends to be supported by the thought that
Wordsworth's account of his formation is somehow too inhuman. That
formation, many would urge, simply cannot have been the result
entirely or predominantly of interchanges between the poet's inmost
soul and imagination, on the one hand, and sublime and beautiful
scenes in nature, on the other. What about the influence on him of
other people—parents, siblings, friends, teachers, discussants, readers,
and so on? Moreover, what results from the formation that is re-
counted—apparently a soul in self-possession and self-satisfaction in
retirement—seems equally inhuman and deplorable. What about hu-
man obligations not only to one's family and to other intimates, but also
to the life of society? Can a life and its formation be exemplary if they
do not include significant achievements of human care and social
justice?
There can perhaps be no conclusive refutation of these charges.
There is undeniably a significant individualist and perfectionist strain
in Wordsworth's account of his formation, a strain that embraces the
thought that it is "the mind of man"—not the life of a social or familial
community—that "is itself / Of quality and fabric more divine" (XIV,
450, 455-56). In coming to understand and satisfy the transcendental
demands on human nature that he supports, each of us must be,
Wordsworth tells us, "Power to thyself; no Helper hast thou here; /
Here keepest thou in singleness thy state: / No other can divide with
thee this work: / No secondary hand can intervene / To fashion this
ability. . . ." (XTV, 210-14).
At the same time, however, these individualist and perfectionist
strains are also significantly qualified, and the aspects of these strains
that survive qualification themselves may be humanly and politically
significant and defensible. Wordsworth continually insists, in both The
Prelude and other works, that his particular formation, like the forma-
tions of persons in general, began not in him alone, but in human and
natural relations, in such a way that the first moment of individual
being is necessarily irrecoverable and unnameable in being bound up
in undecomposable human and natural processes. Wordsworth further
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displays persistent anxiety over the reception of his work, as though to
acknowledge that his achievement does not stand on its own apart from
the life his thoughts and writings may find within a human community,
even within the widest community of persons in general that it
remained his continual aim to address. The Prelude itself includes lavish
concluding thanks to Dorothy, to Mary, to Coleridge, and toWordsworth's
benefactor Raisley Calvert (XIV, 232-301) for their parts in his develop-
ment, and, in being addressed to Coleridge, is itself a vehicle of
friendship, including thanks and rejoinders and common remem-
brances. If all these bits of thanks and senses of the presences of others
in the poet's life sometimes strike us as belated or as stemming from
anxieties about either the poem's reception or the plausibility of its
accounts, they may also sometimes strike us as appropriate and human.
Humanly and politically, Wordsworth's individualism and perfection-
ism bespeak an opposition to the values and aspirations of both
domestic coziness and progressive utilitarianism. A reminder that we
are responsible for the continuous care of our own souls, for living up
to the values associated with the sublime and the beautiful, opposes our
tendencies to domestic relaxation and self-congratulation. Rather than
being in comfort, we are to become Powers, thence to achieve fully
human relations with others, so that what passes between persons shall
reflect their deepest mindedness rather than only certain limited,
common, domestic, material lots. Against progressive and reformist
utilitarianism, Wordsworth's individualism and perfectionism remind
us that political reform must itself be carried out in the name of a vision
of the human person and its freedoms and powers. Amelioration of
general human misery, no matter how important it is, is on its own
perhaps not enough to give point or shape to a human life, and efforts
at amelioration logically presuppose a vision of the appropriate possi-
bilities of persons. Hence a perfectionist account ofwhat is possible and
fit for persons is logically in order, if it can otherwise sustain itself as
humanly plausible. Whether Wordsworth's particular strains of indi-
vidualism and perfectionism, qualified as they are, are or are not
implausible or authoritarian or antidemocratic will be for us to judge,
as we arrive, following Wordsworth, at our own accounts of our
formations and of what is possible for persons. As with any effort to
articulate transcendental demands on human nature from within the
frame of an account of a particular individual's formation, we will have
to test Wordsworth's vision of our possibilities and necessities against
our own, juxtaposing our interpretations, out of our own lives and
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experiences, against his. The contestation ofvariant particular interpre-
tations of personhood and the transcendental demands on it thus
appear, in our reception of Wordsworth's interpretation of his own
formation, as the general place of philosophical reflection within
human life.
Not only, however, do our efforts to test the plausibility ofWordsworth's
interpretation of his formation demonstrate the contestable, interpre-
tive character of any account of transcendental demands on human
personhood, but Wordsworth's own efforts at concluding his narrative
and sustaining his transcendental claims also make manifest what might
be called the deep logic of any effort to articulate and sustain
transcendental claims from within a particular human position. In the
concluding passages of The Prelude, narrative particularity not only
situates and humanizes, but also continuously competes with, transcen-
dental generality. Wordsworth's effort to cast his own formation by
experiences of the sublime and the beautiful as a general and valuable
possibility for human life is marked by its denial of crucial features of
his development that have led him toward his philosophical reflections.
"Never did I," Wordsworth tells us, "in quest of right and wrong, /
Tamper with conscience from a private aim; / Nor was in any public
hope the dupe / Of selfish passions" (XIV, 150-53)—a claim clearly
belied by the earlier, and more plausible, confession that he had
initially supported the public hope of the French Revolution out of the
selfish hope that he might therein become one of the authoritative
"single persons" upon whom "the destiny of Man had still hung" (X,
155-56). "Nor," Wordsworth tells us, did he "ever yield wilfully to mean
cares or low pursuits" (XIV, 153-54)—a claim again clearly belied by
the earlier confession of how, at Cambridge, he had regularly left the
lecture rooms (III, 74-75) to follow his "social . . . heart" that "loved
idleness andjoy" (III, 212) and "the ordinary works / Of careless youth"
(III, 244-45). "Companionships, / Friendships, acquaintances, were
welcome all. We sauntered, played, or rioted; we talked / Unprofitable
talk at morning hours; / Drifted about along the streets and walks" (III,
249-53). This habit of seeking out entertainments clearly continued,
the narrative has already informed us, in London, where Wordsworth
likewise succumbed to the "allurement" of low forms of theater and
pantomime, spent his time surveying "The spectacles within doors,"
and wandering through the "din, / Barbarian and infernal," of the
Bartholomew Fair (VII, 263, 230, 686-87).
These denials ("Nor did I . . . , Nor was . . . , nor did ever . . .") are
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essential to Wordsworth's general transcendental claims. It is as though
he must distinguish between his actual, empirical self, moments of
whose experience he had earlier narrated, and a deeper, purer,
ontological self, which was really influenced all along only by its destiny,
enabled by sublimity and beauty, to become a Power. This distinction
appears in the moment of conclusion of the writing, as it strives for
philosophical generality, despite the claim that what has been "retraced"
is only "A humbler destiny" of less than perfect progress (XIV, 136).
The distinction between a brighter, transcendental self and a darker,
empirical one is Wordsworth's typical response to what Johnston has
described as his continuing "uncertainty . . . that his 'restorations' were
real, actual, true, permanent, substantial—in a word, philosophically or
metaphysically certain."19
Not only is this distinction typical of Wordsworth's writing, but it is
also typical of philosophical writing generally, for it reenacts the
traditional philosophical distinction between the bright self of reason
and the darker, unrulier, empirically affected self of desire and materi-
ality. In receiving the instructions of sublimity and beauty, these two
aspects of human beings are in simultaneous competition and commu-
nication. Reason and sublimity here figure as the voice of individuality
and departure; materiality and beauty as the voices of community and
interrelatedness. Here the effort to secure the generality, the reason-
ableness, of any transcendental conclusions about our common possi-
bilities and values requires the canceling of the very swerves into
particularity that humanize the narrative of development underwriting
these conclusions. Philosophical writing remains caught between infla-
tion into implausible claims to pure philosophical understanding and
to have traveled an unsullied path toward it, on the one hand, and
collapse into insignificant, empirical, narrative particularity, on the
other. The general transcendental claims, and the possibility of a
smooth progression toward them, must be introduced if the narrative is
to overcome particularity so as to attain its significance as a source of
moral instruction that will ease and further our own achievements. Yet
the particularity of the entire narrative that leads up to these conclu-
sions is the only vehicle for making them humanly plausible. The
activity of philosophizing thus occurs continuously caught between
collapse into particularity and its narcissism, on the one hand, and
inflation into emptiness, on the other. There is here no ready way of
"stopping doing philosophy."20 It is perhaps in partial awareness of the
continuous threat to internalist transcendentalism that it will either
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collapse into insignificant particularities or inflate into inhuman and
implausible generalities thatWordsworth wrote that he saw "of absolute
accomplishment / Much wanting, so much wanting, in myself (I, 263-
64) and left The Prelude unpublished in his lifetime.
And yet if there is not in The Prelude any absolute accomplishment,
philosophical reflection, arising within the course of a particular
human life, somehow still takes place. In arising out of and remaining
marked by reflection on the particular, even when it seeks to deny it,
the interpretation of human life and its possibilities that we find in The
Prelude simultaneously opposes smooth and specific teleologies of
human life and resists reduction to a merely particular history of
mechanical associations and experiences. Assured philosophical gener-
ality is continually postponed as we find ourselves "Turned and re-
turned with intricate delay" (IX, 8) by the narrative that would
nonetheless attempt to hold itself together as a unified account of
coming to understand and to satisfy the transcendental demands of the
values associated with sublimity and beauty. What is embodied in this
writing is a kind of perfectionist liberalism, as we see enacted an effort
to understand and exemplify our best human possibilities that nonethe-
less, as situated in the particular, cannot be immediately generalized or
extended to other situations.21 The contending yet mutually enabling
experiences and values of sublimity and beauty that Wordsworth, from
his own life, represents as fundamental to anyone's effort to lead a fully
human life may plausibly have a transcendental claim on us. They may
not. Whether they do will be for each of us to say—"each man's Mind is
to herself/ Witness and judge" (XIII, 366-67)—from within our own
situations and the general interpretations of human life that they
support. Articulating and testing such general interpretations of hu-
man life out of particular experience, without end, is the inevitable
situation of philosophy, as it takes place in the lives of human persons.
Our humanity, Wordsworth's example suggests, is lived out within these
articulations, between the sublimities of partial transcendence into
individual vision and the beauties of partial community in shared
valuations and engagements.
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